The paper studies tax evasion in an evolutionary setting. In addition to standard variables such as the …ne they may have to pay if found guilty or the probability of being audited, individuals' inclination to engage in tax evasion may also be a¤ected by social interactions. Individuals socially interact with other taxpayers and, doing so, they learn the payo¤ di¤erential between paying and evading taxes. Moreover, expected payo¤s may include reputational costs or rewards awarded by society after an individual is audited. The paper shows that (i) social norms may play a very important role in de…ning the long run evolution of tax evasion and, consequently, (ii) policymakers should consider reforms that would increase social awareness and information rather than more (…nancially and politically) expensive traditional auditing instruments; in addition, (iii) …scal/auditing policies should be carefully tailored to the particular economic and social setting in place in a country.
Introduction
Taxes play an essential role for the …nances of a country. Indeed, tax revenues are the basic way a government can …nance national expenditure and services to the population. At the same time, taxes are a very important factor that a¤ects the …nancial decisions of every household and business.
In the attempt to answer the question why individuals evade taxes, the economic literature has taken inspiration from the economics of crime (Becker (1968) ) and traditionally framed tax evasion as a gamble. 1 The key assumption is that no individual, if allowed, would want to pay taxes. Evading taxes then essentially becomes a gamble that individuals may decide to play, depending on their degree of aversion to risk, the probability of being audited and the extent of the possible penalty.
2 Speci…cally, this framework predicts high levels of tax evasion if agents face low audit probability or low penalties. This prediction is, however, in contrast to empirical observation. Tax evasion is, indeed, relatively low in many tax systems, in spite of low audit probability and small penalties. Moreover, even in those environments where evading taxes is possible and often a widespread behavior in the society, there are still individuals who act honestly. The literature has identi…ed three possible explanations to this puzzle. One possibility is the existence of a divergence between auditing rates and detection probabilities 3 . Another possibility is that individuals may tend to overestimate detection probabilities. 4 Finally, individuals may be induced to comply because they experience forms of non-pecuniary motivation.
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This paper focuses on this third option. Indeed, in recent years, the interest of economists (but also sociologists, psychologists and political scientists) has gradually focused away from the question "why do people evade taxes?" to the question "why do people pay taxes?". Researchers have attempted to identify and measure the existence and extend of such non-pecuniary incentives, often referred as tax morale.
6 Luttmer and Singhal (2014) describe various mechanisms according to which tax morale may a¤ect compliance. One mechanism is based on intrinsic motivation. In every society there are individuals who believe that paying taxes is a citizenship duty. Paying taxes is a way to contribute to society's welfare and individuals may obtain private utility from it.
7 Considering tax morale, in turn, helps also understanding why some individuals may …nd very di¢ cult to pay taxes. Luttmer and Singhal (2014) describe reciprocity (the utility experienced from paying taxes that depends on the individual's re-lationship with the government) as another mechanism of tax morale. In those countries in which governments are considered particularly corrupted or inef…cient, tax morale may, therefore, be very low. 8 There is another important aspect of taxpayers' behavior related to tax morale and that is the role that social norms and reputation may play. 9 The way society sees the pro-social actions of an individual may have an important reputational e¤ect on the utility that the individual obtains from performing a particular task. Charity, voluntary work and donations are examples of actions that may provide individuals with reputation bene…t. Bénabou and Tirole (2006) show why standard …nan-cial incentives may be counterproductive in those situations in which reputation e¤ects may induce motivated agents to reduce their pro-social e¤ort, fearing to be seen as greedy by society. Indeed, reputation may play an important role when individuals have to consider reporting their income for tax purposes. If audited and found guilty of tax evasion, there may be a signi…cant social cost, in addition to a standard …ne, that the individual has to face. Similarly, if audited and found not guilty, the individual may enjoy a reputation of honestly and citizenship. Myles and Naylor (1996) , Kim (2003) and Traxler (2010) are examples of contributions in the literature that have attempted to incorporate tax morale directly into the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 's framework. Essentially tax morale is modeled as an internalized social norm that makes tax evasion more costly, a¤ecting the individuals'decisions under risk. Interestingly, introducing tax morale has often the e¤ect of generating multiple equilibria. This poses the necessity to introduce dynamic adjustments to solve equilibrium selection problems and study the long run evolution of tax evasion. Indeed, Luttmer and Singhal (2014) identify long run cultural factors as a signi…cant variable that a¤ects tax morale and compliance.
10 This is important. When considering the e¤ects of social norms and reputation on individuals'actions, a static model may be inadequate and the role played by a continuously evolving cultural framework should be carefully considered. It should be natural to think, therefore, of the individuals'decisions in a dynamic setting. As Besley and Persson (2014) also point out, the ability of a country to enforce compliance may be a¤ected by sociological and cultural factors and, in turn, it may be a key factor de…ning the development trajectory of a whole economy. Most of the theoretical works on tax compliance to date are, however, "one-shot" in nature (see Luttmer and Singhal (2014) ). To our knowledge, the only paper that considers intrinsic motivation, social norms and reputation in a dynamic setting with tax evasion is Besley et al. (2015) . The paper is a dynamic extension of Bénabou and Tirole (2006) where individuals internalize in their utility the reputational bene…t/cost of paying/evading taxes in the previous year. The authors assume that individuals every year need to decide whether to evade taxes. Their decision will depend on their intrinsic motivation, the extent of the …ne if found guilty and the reputational cost of tax evasion. The authors also empirically study the e¤ects of a temporary introduction of a poll tax in Britain. They show that tax evasion increased after the introduction of the poll tax (due to a negative e¤ect in intrinsic motivation/reciprocity). Interestingly, tax evasion continued to persist even after the poll tax was abolished (possibly highlighting the dynamic e¤ects of social norms produced by the existence of a social multiplier).
Our paper shares with Besley et al. (2015) the recognition of the importance of a dynamic analysis of tax evasion. To do so, however, we take a di¤erent approach and consider an evolutionary game with word of mouth dynamics. Speci…cally, our paper contributes to the literature in three ways.
First, in line with Besley et al. (2015) we study tax evasion using a dynamic setting. Besley et al. (2015) , however, do not describe how reputational costs and rewards are connected to the social framework in which individuals interact. In line with related contributions that study pro-social behavior, in Besley et al. (2015) the strength of social norms is expressed by an exogenous parameter. Our aim is to explicitly model the way reputational costs and bene…ts enter the utility of tax payers. In our framework a particularly important feature of the way reputation a¤ects the utility of individuals is that it depends in each period on the particular social practices of the society we are considering. For example, being a honest tax payer in a country where tax evasion is the norm may create a larger reputational e¤ect compared to the same behavior in a country where honest reports are instead the majority. Similarly, being found guilty in a country where most of the population evades taxes may be less costly in terms of reputation than being found guilty in a mostly honest country. While in Besley et al. (2015) individuals' reputation is a¤ected by their decision to pay or evade taxes in the previous period, in our model the extent of the social cost/bene…t on a dishonest/honest individual depends on how widespread a phenomenon tax evasion is in the society.
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Second, Besley et al. (2015) study long run equilibria employing standard adaptive dynamics. In our model, instead, the dynamic development of tax evasion is described in the form of evolutionary dynamics. Individuals are assumed to be programmed to behave honestly or dishonestly. Whether one or the other (or both) behavior survives in the society is determined by an evolutionary adaptation process, that depends on the expected payo¤s of individuals. In standard evolutionary games it is assumed that individuals are able to compare their expected payo¤s to the expected payo¤s of the whole population. This is somewhat implausible when considering the decision to evade taxes of an individual. It seems more plausible, instead, to imagine that an individual will be able to compare his/her payo¤s with the payo¤s of those individuals with whom he/she has been socially interacting. This is in line with those contributions in the literature that stress the importance of network formation and the way the network of relationships may in ‡uence individuals 'conduct. 12 In our model we consider a word of mouth process where in each period one individual meets another. If both individuals are of the same type (honest/dishonest), then they have no information to wage the advantages of choosing a di¤erent behavior. However, if an individual meets a taxpayer of a di¤erent type, then they can learn and possibly change their behavior. The probability of facing a tax evader will depend on the level of tax evasion in a certain period.
Finally, Besley et al. (2015) study a tax system in which all individuals belonging to a local council earn the same income and, therefore, face the same tax rate. In contrast, we explicitly describe a progressive tax system with two bands and two tax rates. This allows us to study what is the e¤ect on the dynamics of tax evasion of changes in tax rates and the possibility of a reform toward a ‡at rate system. This feature of our model helps us to acquire a better understanding of the e¤ects that have been produced by recent reforms in various countries, with a particularly important example provided by Russia. In 2001 a progressive tax system with rates 12%, 20% and 30% was replaced in Russia by a ‡at tax rate of 13%. Interestingly Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) empirically showed that the reform produced a reduction in tax evasion. Our model can help explain this result.
Our dynamic analysis shows that the existence and the attributes (including stability) of the long run equilibria de…ning the level of tax evasion in a country signi…cantly depend of the parameters that describe tax morale, social norms and reputational e¤ects. In addition, the dynamic trajectories of the evolution of tax evasion depend of the initial conditions of the model. This implies that two (both economically and socially) identical countries may experience very di¤erent levels of tax evasion in the long run if the initial levels of evasions di¤er signi…cantly. Supported by these results, the paper shows that the social norms and framework where tax evasion takes place play a very important role in guiding individuals'actions. This result produces two important implications. First, policymakers should consider reforms that would modify social awareness, social norms and reputational incentives, rather than (or in addition to) more (…nancially and politically) expensive standard …scal instruments. 13 Second, it is essential to carefully understand the social norms of a country and in particular the e¤ects that tax reforms may produce depending on the particular social framework. In other words, simply replicating tax reforms that have proved to be successful abroad may produce unexpected and perverse long run e¤ects in another country.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 describes some important policy implications based on comparative statics analysis. Section 4 describes the dynamic analysis. Section 5 generalizes the analysis and our treatment of tax morale discussing how the results are a¤ected by introducing di¤erent classes of social norms representing di¤erent societies and cultures. Section 6 concludes. Suppose that a progressive tax system is in place, with tax rates 0 < t L < t H < 1. Tax payers need to report their taxable income. Agents who report
The model
Obviously, low income agents have no incentive to report a level of income other than Y L . High income tax payers, however, may …nd desirable to evade taxes reporting a level of income equal to Y L . Let us de…ne r 2 [0; 1] the portion of high income agents who decide to evade taxes. Suppose that with probability p 2 [0; 1] an agent is audited by the tax authority. Let us assume that, if audited, a dishonest agent is found guilty with certainty. If high income agents have truthfully reported their income Y H , then they enjoy a positive reputational e¤ect for being exposed to society as honest taxpayers. We assume that this reputation e¤ect increases as the share of dishonest agents in the population increases. The reputational bene…t for being proved honest is r with > 0. If, instead, a high income agent, who has decided to evade taxes and report income Y L , is audited and charged with tax evasion, (s)he will have to pay a …ne equal to M on top of the increment in taxes t H (Y H Y L ). Being found guilty of tax evasion has also a negative e¤ect on the utility of the tax evader because of the reputational costs. Indeed, being recognized by society as a tax evader creates a reputational cost for the dishonest agent. We assume that this social shaming e¤ect increases as the share of honest agents increases.
14 The reputational cost for the dishonest agent is equal to
(1 r)
The set of social norms and reputational e¤ects described here is clearly a simpli…cation, but it does provide important insights to the problem that will be described in section 3 and 4. In section 5 we shall consider how results change when di¤erent classes of social norms and tax morale are introduced.
Considering reputation and shaming e¤ects, the utility of an honest highincome taxpayer is
whereas the utility of a dishonest high-income taxpayer is
Timing unravels as follows. At the beginning of each period all agents report their income and pay taxes. With probability p they are audited by the tax agency. After auditing, two agents are randomly selected and matched by nature from the population. The two selected agents learn whether the agent they have been put in contact with has been audited and whether (s)he has been found guilty of tax evasion.
Comparative statics analysis
The expected utility, at time t; of a dishonest agent is
whereas the expected utility, at time t; of a honest agent is
For easing the notation, denote the di¤erence in expected utilities by
Function y(r) is often referred to as the "score" function. 15 Expected utilities from the two behaviors are equal for a fraction r when y(r
0, which gives the unique possible equilibrium of the system
Moreover, it is r 2 (0; 1) in the following cases:
The di¤erence of expected utilities between di¤erent agents is meaningful as we assumed that they are ex-ante identical.
2. 0 < # < and e t H < t H < b t H , where
In the next section we study the dynamic stability of the system and show that only when > an interior equilibrium r = r 2 (0; 1) may be (locally asymptotically) stable. It is easy to show that if > ; then the sign of > 0 implies that an increase in the tax rate for the wealthier group of individuals increases tax evasion. In other words, a higher tax rate makes tax evasion more pro…table for individuals. This is intuitive. Nonetheless our result stands in contrast to previous theoretical contributions showing that tax evasion tends to decrease if the tax rate increases (see Yitzhaki (1974) ). A consequence of this result is that if the high tax rate is lowered, to the limit, to match t L , introducing in other words a ‡at rate system, then ceteris paribus tax evasion would decreases. dr dM < 0 and dr dp < 0 show that standard auditing instruments to …ght tax evasion may be e¤ective. These instruments, however, usually come at a cost for every government. The cost is both …nancial, since auditing is in general expensive, and political, since a government that intends to harshly …ght tax evasion may be seen as oppressive and greedy. For this reason, the fact that dr d < 0 and dr d < 0 is very important. Policies and public campaigns that increase social awareness towards tax evasion and citizenship may be a cheaper (…nancially and politically) and, nonetheless, e¤ective alternative to auditing. In this sense, approaches that consider naming and shaming or commending tax evaders/payers may be desirable.
Word of mouth
In this section, we endogenize r, the fraction of high income agents who decide to evade taxes, by considering the average payo¤ obtained by each strategy. It is reasonable to assume that at time t the probability of being dishonest is approximated by the fraction r of dishonest agents in the population at that time. Then, this probability is updated according to the expected utilities from the two possible behaviors (honest or dishonest), as speci…ed below. This way, an updated fraction of high income agents that will evade taxes at time t + 1 is obtained. We model the dynamics of the probability of being dishonest by the word of mouth evolutionary framework proposed by Dawid (1999). 16 Suppose that at each (discrete) time period two agents meet and compare their positions. If both agents have the same behavior (either both honest or both dishonest), they have the same utility and no need for switching behavior arises. However, if one honest taxpayer meets a dishonest taxpayer, they could reconsider their behavior according to the utility obtained by the other agent. Thus, an honest agent may change her mind if she meets a dishonest and their utility is di¤erent. Clearly, the higher the di¤erence is between the dishonest and the honest's utility, the more likely the honest will become dishonest. De…ne by the probability of switching behavior from honest to dishonest given that U d U h , and denote it by (U d U h ):
, being a probability distribution function, is non-decreasing in its argu-
All in all, the probability p h!d that an honest becomes dishonest is given by the probability that an honest meets a dishonest, which is r, times the probability to change behavior, namely
from which it follows that the probability to remain honest is p h!h = 1 p h!d . Analogously, a dishonest agent can become honest with a probability given by the probability that (s)he meets an honest, which is (1 r), times the probability that a dishonest becomes honest, given the di¤erence in utilities U h U d . Clearly, ( y) = 1 (y), so that the overall probability that a dishonest becomes honest is
with an obvious meaning of the notation. Finally, it is
Suppose that the matching between agents of the population is uniform and that a large number of sampling from the population is taken. This way, the average utility di¤erence of the two behaviors is well approximated by the expected di¤erence (3).
1 6 Here we explain the evolutionary dynamics along the lines of the classical biological interpretation of replicator dynamics. However, with human beings the behavior of an agent can be updated even within the same generation, as one can change her mind (i.e. switch the kind of behavior) by observing the performance of other agents. A similar modeling structure as the one here proposed has been employed in evolutionary oligopolies to investigate competition where players have di¤erent information sets or di¤erent objective functions, see Bischi et al. (2015 ), Cerboni Baiardi et al. (2015 , Droste et al. (2002) , Kopel et al. (2014), De Giovanni and .
From now on, we denote by r t the fraction of dishonest tax payers, where t emphasizes its dependence on time. Notice that, because of the reputational e¤ects of auditing, the expected payo¤s are functions of the fraction r t , i.e.
The dynamics of the probability r t can be written as follows:
which can be rewritten as the unidimensional map
where G(x) = 2 (x) 1. Equation (6) can be described as a balance equation: the fraction of dishonest agents at time t + 1, r t+1 , is increased by the expected fraction of agents that decide to become dishonest, (1 r t ) p h!d , and decreased by the expected fraction of agents that decide to become honest, r t p d!h . G inherits from the following properties:
Moreover, being a distribution function, by assuming unimodality and symmetry of the corresponding density function, the following assumptions on G hold:
2. G is odd (symmetric with respect to 0);
G is increasing;
4. G is convex in ( 1; 0) and concave in (0; +1); 5. G is di¤erentiable at least in y = 0.
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One important property of map (7) is the following. For a given r t 2 (0; 1) it is r t+1 > r t [<] if and only if G(y(r t )) > 0 [< 0]. By monotonicity of G(:), the sign of G(:) coincides with the sign of y(r), so that an increment (decrement) in the share r occurs if and only if y(r) > 0 [< 0]. By this property, we can say that the dynamical system (7) is a particular example of monotone selection dynamics, see Cressman (2003) and Weibull (1995) for details. 1 7 A possible speci…cation for G(x) is G(x) = 2 arctan 2 x , see Bischi et al. (2009) , where = G 0 (0) > 0 is a parameter that model the intensity of choice, i.e. in our context the willingness to change behavior from honest to dishonest for chasing utility di¤erential y(r) over time. This functional form satis…es all the required assumptions to be employed in (7). We shall adopt this speci…cation in the numerical analysis provided in section 5.
Dynamics
This section is devoted to the analysis of the discrete-time model (7), which models how the fraction of dishonest agents evolve over time. Map (7) admits two kinds of …xed points:
boundary equilibria, r 0 = 0 and r 1 = 1;
inner equilibria, which are any r 2 (0; 1) such that y(r ) = 0, i.e. such that expected utilities of behaving honestly or dishonestly are equal,
On one hand, boundary equilibria exist for all parameters values and correspond to monomorphic population con…gurations where all agents are honest (r 0 = 0) or dishonest (r 1 = 1). On the other hand, the inner equilibrium r in (4) only exists when the tax rate t H belongs to given intervals, as we remarked before, see (5); r corresponds to a polymorphic con…guration of the population of high income taxpayers where both honest and dishonest agents are present. For this inner equilibrium, one important question is related to its stability: what happens when the system is in a state that is di¤erent from the equilibrium? Will the generic trajectory converge to equilibrium r or not? We answer these questions in proposition 1. In proposition A.1 in the appendix we report the full description of the adjustment dynamics of map (7).
Proposition 1
Consider the adjustment dynamics modelled by map (7) and the thresholds levels e t H and b t H in (5).
The inner equilibrium r in (4) is asymptotically stable with basin of attraction B(r ) = (0; 1) i¤ e t H < t H < b t H and > > 0 and the following "non-overshooting" condition holds:
At G 0 (0) = 2 p(1 r )r ( ) , equilibrium r looses stability through a perioddoubling bifurcation, with the appearance of cyclic or chaotic motion as parameter G 0 (0) is further increased.
An interior equilibrium, where only a portion r 2 (0; 1) of the population decides to evade taxes can be meaningful and stable only for intermediate values of t H and > . An intermediate t H ensures that a portion of the population in equilibrium may …nd pro…table to evade and at the same time the remaining portion may …nd optimal to pay taxes honestly. In addition, it is necessary that > for r 2 (0; 1) to be a stable equilibrium. In other words, only a system that has in place social norms that prioritize commending and nurturing honest behavior rather than naming and shaming tax evasion can reach a stable interior equilibrium. If instead < , in the long run the system will converge to full honestly or full tax evasion, depending on the particular original value of r.
An implication of proposition 1 (described in detail in proposition A.1 in the appendix) is that regardless of the bene…ts/costs created by social norms and pro-social behavior, the system may reach corner solutions for extreme values of the tax rate t H . This is intuitive. If t H is su¢ ciently low, then the expected pay-o¤ of those individuals who honestly pay taxes is higher compared to the pay-o¤ of those who evade taxes. Evolutionary dynamics will take the system to a stable equilibrium in which all individuals would pay taxes and tax evasion disappears. The other extreme is produced when t H is su¢ ciently high. Now tax evasion may be a pro…table alternative to pay taxes honestly. Evolutionary dynamics would take the system to a stable equilibrium in which all individuals evade taxes. These two extremes show how important it is to understand the long run as much as the short run e¤ects of …scal policies. Changes in tax rates may have short run positive e¤ects on tax revenue collection, but they may also bring catastrophic long run e¤ects.
A …nal comment before moving to a discussion of the e¤ects of tax morale and more realistic types of social norms. We argued that, regardless of the bene…ts/costs created by social norms and pro-social behavior, a level of t H su¢ ciently low would ensure low or no tax evasion in the long run. As long as t L < max[ b t H ; e t H ], then a reduction in t H would produce an evolutionary path towards a reduction of tax evasion. Indeed, for t L < max[ b t H ; e t H ], allowing t H ! t L (in other words introducing a ‡at rate t = t H = t L ) would ensure that a strictly positive portion of the population will pay taxes honestly. In addition, this honest portion of the population will be higher the lower will be the ‡at rate. This result provides a dynamic and behavioral explanation of the reduction in tax evasion experienced in Russia after the adoption of a ‡at rate system in 2001.
Social norms and tax morale
In section 4 we showed that reputation (described by parameters and ) can play a very important role in de…ning individuals' behavior and, ultimately, the degree of tax evasion in the long run. The reputational rewards/costs that we have considered so far implicitly assumed a very speci…c con…guration of social norms. In other words, it was assumed that society rewarded (if honest) and punished (if dishonest) in an increasing measure individuals that acted in contrast to the majority of the population. In this section we provide a more general and realistic description of society and we explicitly model social norms in the reputational rewards and costs.
If audited, honest taxpayers now internalize in their utility function the following reputational rewards/costs
where > 0, K 2 [0; 1] and 0. In section 4 we e¤ectively considered the case
In what follows, we assume K = 1 and disregard intermediate values of K for which the results are analogous to the case K = 1. describes again the scale of the reputational e¤ect of being identi…ed as a honest agent. However, the extent of the reputational e¤ect now depends also on social norms as described by parameter . Speci…cally, describes the extent of the level of society's appreciation for honest behavior. Indeed, notice that if 2, then R h is monotonically increasing in r. This scenario describes a society in which honest behavior is more rewarded the higher is the level of tax evasion in the population. In other words, this reputation e¤ect increases as the share of dishonest agents in the population increases. Qualitatively this scenario replicates the same society that we have studied in section 4. If < 2, however, R h is maximized for some value of r between 0 and 1. The model now describes a society where honest tax payers obtain a positive reputation that increases in r only if a small portion of the population engages in tax evasion. However, if r is su¢ ciently large (r > =2), then honest behavior (seen as an action against conformity to social practices) tends to be less appreciated by society.
18 Eventually, for su¢ ciently small ( < 1) and r relatively large (r > ), honest behavior will be disliked by society, who may now assign a bad reputation to honest tax payers. In this scenario honest individuals are e¤ectively discriminated for going against the majority of the population.
Social norms can also a¤ect the reputational cost of dishonest agents. Suppose that the reputation cost of being found guilty of tax evasion is now equal to
with > 0 describing again the scale of the reputational e¤ect of being identi…ed as a dishonest agent. 19 Similar to case of honest agents, we shall focus on the case where K = 1. Social norms towards tax evasion are again described by parameter . A su¢ ciently large ( 1) describes a society that clearly dislikes dishonest behavior and, therefore, R d represents the disutility experienced by dishonest individuals for any value of r. In addition, notice that the reputational cost of tax evasion is highest when the dishonest agent operates in an environment in which most individuals honestly pay taxes. Interestingly, a smaller ( < 1) would describe, instead, a society more lenient toward tax evasion. If only a small portion of the population evades taxes (r < ), dishonest individuals still obtain a negative reputation e¤ect. However, if tax evasion is a more widespread phenomenon in the society (r > ), then dishonest individuals may even obtain a positive reputation. In other words, they are recognized a "smart" and the conformity of their actions to the practices of the majority of society is rewarded. 
where 2 [ 1; 1]. A value of > 0 denotes a positive tax morale, i.e. the taxpayer obtains an extra bene…t from paying high taxes, for example because of its contribution to society. Otherwise, < 0 denotes a negative tax morale, i.e. paying high taxes is perceived as a waste of money. We can now rewrite the utilities of an high-income taxpayer as follows:
ensuring the tractability of the model. 2 0 In the latest US presidential elections the issue of dubious tax strategies employed by one of the candidates has been raised in numerous occasions (see http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/us/politics/donald-trump-tax.html?_r=0). The candidate and his supporters have also explicitly described his actions as "smart" (see http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/26/politics/donald-trump-federal-income-taxes-smartdebate/).
Figure 2: E¤ects of dishonest reputation as a function of social practices (r) in relation to social norms ( ) whereas the utility of a dishonest high-income taxpayer is
Similarly to our analysis in section 4, the expected utility of a dishonest agent is given by
whereas the expected utility of a honest agent reads
Also in this case word of mouth dynamics of the form (7) always admit the boundary states r 0 = 0 and r 1 = 1 as equilibria of the model. However with tax morale and social costs, there are two possible inner equilibrium shares of dishonest agents satisfying an isoutility condition where the score function
is zero. By solving equation y(r) = 0 with respect to r, we obtain the two equilibrium shares
In what follows we provide a qualitative description of the dynamics of map (7) with score function de…ned in (11). The results of numerical analysis are based on the simple functional form for G(y(r)) previously employed by Bischi et al. (2003a,b) and Bischi et al. (2009) , see footnote 6 for details. Notice, however, that the qualitative properties of the dynamics here considered do not depend on the exact speci…cation of G(y), but on the form of the utility di¤erential y(r). Thus, a functional form such as the one in footnote 6 is just a useful way to obtain in explicit form a dynamical system that models switching from honest to dishonest behavior and vice-versa. Let us start the analysis by a diagrammatic exercise that summarizes typical transition scenarios of the model as parameters are varied. Figure 3 provides four cobweb plots in the plane (r t ; r t+1 ) of word of mouth dynamics (7), where the parameter values are Y L = 19; Y H = 92; M = 7:5; t L = 30%; t H = 56; 5%; = 1; p = 0:6; = 1; = 1:8 and = 65. We consider in the four plots the same three initial conditions: 5% (red); 25% (grey) and 50% (blue) of dishonest agents.
(a) The top left plot has = 0:276 and = 0:93. The plot shows that in the long run the system converges to the boundary equilibrium in which all agents are dishonest. Inner equilibria r 1;2 in (12) are not feasible (they are not real numbers) for these parameter values.
(b) The top right plot depicts a cobweb diagram with the same parameters of plot (a) except for = 0:953: The increase in causes a fold bifurcation where the equilibria r 1;2 in (12) are created. In this case, trajectories with initial conditions below the threshold given by the inner steady state just created converge to it, whereas trajectories with initial conditions above the threshold converge to r 1 = 1 (where all individuals are dishonest in the long run). (c) The bottom left plot describes a further increase in , which is now = 0:96. Here r 1 12:9% < r 2 27:54%, see (12). For these parameter values the lower equilibrium r 1 is stable (here overshooting does not occur, since parameter is su¢ ciently low) and the basin of attraction of r 1 , i.e. all initial conditions of the share of dishonest agents, whose trajectories eventually converge to r 1 , is B(r 1 ) = (0; r 2 ). Notice that trajectories starting with 5% and 25% of dishonest agents converge to r 1 , while trajectories with initial conditions above r 2 converge to r 1 = 1 (e.g. the depicted trajectory with 50% of dishonest as initial condition).
(d) The bottom right plot describes the e¤ects of an increase in tax morale . Speci…cally, parameters are the same as in case (c), except for = 0:3. An increase in produces two transcritical bifurcations (i.e. r 1 and r 2 are real numbers, but they do not belong to the set (0; 1)). The increase in tax morale has induced the system to converge to the boundary equilibrium in which no individual evades taxes.
The various dynamics here described can also be appraised by observing the bifurcation diagrams in …gure 4, where stable equilibria are depicted as solid curves and unstable equilibria as dashed ones. The plots in …gure 4 show how the variation of a parameter in a given interval (here an increment in or in M ) can produce transitions from cases where tax evasion tends to rise over time to cases where the opposite occurs, as the intuition would suggest; for intermediate values of the varying parameter ( and M respectively), one or two equilibria of the type r 1;2 in (12) may exists.
The plots reported in …gure 3 and 4 provide important policy insights. First, social norms (represented in our model by parameter ) play a critical role in de…ning the long run level of tax evasion in a society. Traditional …scal/auditing policies in a society that is relatively lenient (low ) toward tax evasion will be ine¤ective and the society will see the level of tax evasion rise with time. If society, instead, is less forgiving of dishonest behavior (high ), then the level of tax evasion may converge to equilibria in which only a portion of the population engages in dishonest practices. This observation has important policy implications. Focusing on traditional …scal/auditing policies (i.e. variations in tax rates, …nes and auditing e¤ort) may not be as e¤ective as carefully understanding and in ‡uencing social norms. Forms of social-norms marketing (e.g. information campaigns, moral exhortation, fear-inducing messages, nudging 21 ) could prove to be more e¤ective (and less expensive) than standard approaches. Social-norms marketing could be used to generate shocks in the value of in the attempt to create a less lenient society toward tax evasion.
Another important insight provided by the plots in …gure 3 and 4 is that the initial conditions (i.e. the initial level of tax evasion) are critical to understand the evolution of tax evasion. Consider two economically and socially identical countries. Suppose that these two countries have the same parameter values and for both the evolutionary patterns of tax evasion can be described by plot 3(c) or by …gure 4. If the initial levels of tax evasion di¤er (e.g. above or below the dashed red curves of …gure 4(a) or 4(b), such as the points labeled A and D in those plots), however, the two countries will experience very di¤erent levels of tax evasion in the long run. This remark produces a very important caveat for those policymakers who may decide to adopt …scal/auditing policies that have proved to be successful in other countries. Even if countries are rather similar economically and socially, if the initial level of tax evasion in the domestic country signi…cantly di¤ers, it is possible that the imported policies may produce dramatically di¤erent results.
Note, in addition, that the numerical analysis described in …gure 3 shows that the level of tax morale may signi…cantly modify the evolutionary process of the level of tax evasion in a country. The countries described in plots (d) and (c) are identical, except for the level of tax morale. Starting with plot 3(d), where tax morale is relatively high, we see that in the long run the system sees the whole population acting honestly. If tax morale decreases (perhaps because the government is seen by the population as corrupt and ine¢ cient due to a scandal), the evolutionary process of tax evasion changes dramatically and is now described by plot (c). This observation highlights the importance of carefully understanding tax morale and including its e¤ects in the de…nition of …scal/auditing policies. We mentioned above that social-norm marketing may be a more e¤ective and cheaper instrument against tax evasion that traditional auditing policies. Our understanding of the e¤ects of tax morale sheds some additional light on this matter and provides another important caveat. Psychology literature acknowledges that social-norm marketing, unfortunately, does not come without potential drawbacks. 22 In particular, a known problem of social-norm marketing is the possibility of boomerang e¤ ects, i.e. the possibility that the attempt to induce a society to modify its social norms may produce perverse e¤ects. This aspect of social-norm marketing further increases the importance of understanding the e¤ects of tax morale. For example, a social campaign targeting moral exhortation (i.e. increase ), if accompanied by fear-inducing messages (for example the threat of forms of naming and shaming for dishonest individuals) may change the perception of individuals (who now may see the government as greedy and oppressive) and generate the perverse e¤ect of reducing tax morale (i.e. lowering ).
The bifurcation diagrams in …gure 4 provide also relevant information on the global dynamics of the system; in particular, they show that the system may exhibit irreversibility, which is a form of hysteresis (see Arnold (1992) for details). Let us suppose that the initial state of the system is as in point A of …gure 4(a), where a reduction of dishonest behavior tends to occur. Now a reduction in takes the system to point B, where dishonest behavior spreads in the society; here, if the policymaker wanted to restore the system to the previous situation, setting to its initial level could be insu¢ cient to invert the evolutionary tendency towards generalized tax evasion. In fact, if the system is in a point such as C, restoring to the initial level brings the system to point D, where the tendency is still to converge to equilibrium r 1 = 1 where all agents are dishonest.
The diagrams provide also insights regarding the e¤ects of policies related to traditional auditing instruments. Suppose, for example, that is high enough so that in the long run converge to equilibrium r 0 = 0 is likely to occur. Because of this tendency toward honest behavior, the government may decide to reduce the …ne M and take the system to the situation depicted in …gure 4(b), where = 1:775 and where changes in the …ne M are depicted. For comparison purposes with …gure 4(a), start with M = 7:5 and consider a gradual reduction of the …ne. The share of dishonest agents rises continuously with the reduction of the …ne M , but this only occurs up to the tipping point at M 6:1 below which all agents …nd more pro…table to evade taxes. Thus, small reductions of …nes seem to induce small increments of the share of dishonest agents. However, this could hold only locally, i.e. only for given reductions of the fee and not for all reduction of it. Here, we also …nd the same kind of irreversibility of the action of the policymaker that we detected in the example of …gure 4(a), see the points A, B, C, D, where the discussion regarding hysteresis is similar to the case previously discussed.
Conclusions
We have shown that the social norms and the cultural framework where tax evasion takes place may play a very important role in guiding individuals'actions and, ultimately, the long run extent of tax evasion. In line with OECD recommendations, 23 policymakers should consider adopting forms of social-norms marketing to increase awareness and social incentives and modify tax payers' conduct. Indeed, standard instruments in the hands of …scal policymakers, such as the probability of auditing or the size of the penalty when taxpayers are found guilty of tax evasion, may be less e¤ective than forms of social-norms marketing attempting to in ‡uence social norms and reputational bene…ts/costs. In addition, compared to traditional …scal instruments, social instruments tend to be less costly both …nancially (auditing and investigations are in general expensive) and politically (a government that declared to increase auditing e¤ort and tax evasion …nes may appear in some circumstances too oppressive and that may have a negative e¤ect on tax morale). The paper also provided an important caveat. Given the importance of social norms, it would be foolish to expect that tax reforms that have been successful in a country will also necessarily produce positive results in another, if the societies in those countries are signi…cantly di¤erent. Finally, the model discussed in the paper provides insights regarding the way tax rates may a¤ect compliance. In particular, in contrast to results reported in previous literature, tax evasion tends to decrease when the highest tax rate in a progressive system is lowered. The possibility that lowering the high tax rate may help reducing tax evasion in the long run may explain why reforming the system to adopt a ‡at rate may have positive e¤ect in increasing the honesty of tax payers. In this sense, the paper points toward a possible explanation to the signi…cant and surprising results of the introduction of a ‡at rate system in Russia in 2001.
-When t L < t H < b t H the boundary equilibrium r 0 = 0 is asymptotically stable with basin of attraction B(r 0 ) = [0; 1), the boundary equilibrium r 1 = 1 is unstable and the inner equilibrium r in (4) is not meaningful; -When b t H < t H < e t H the inner equilibrium r in (4) is unstable and constitutes the basin boundary of the locally stable …xed points r 0 = 0 and r 1 = 1, with basins of attraction B(r 0 ) = [0; r ) and B(r 1 ) = (r ; 1] respectively;
-When e t H < t H < 1 the boundary equilibrium r 1 = 1 is locally asymptotically stable with basin of attraction B(r 1 ) = (0; 1], the boundary equilibrium r 0 = 0 is unstable and the inner equilibrium r in (4) is not meaningful; -At t H = b t H a transcritical bifurcation occurs, at which equilibria r and r 1 merge and exchange their stability properties; -At t H = e t H a transcritical bifurcation occurs, at which equilibria r and r 0 merge and exchange their stability properties.
Proof. By the properties of map (7), if G(y(r)) > 0[< 0] for all r 2 (0; 1), then the generic trajectory starting at initial condition r 0 2 (0; 1) will converge to r 1 = 1 (r 0 = 0). Applying this property, we get the stability conditions for the boundary equilibria. Linearization of (7) gives dr t+1 dr t = 1 + (1 2r t )G(y(r t )) + r t (1 r t )G 0 (y(r t ))y 0 (r t )
from which, since at r it is G(y(r )) = 0, it is dr t+1 dr t rt=r = 1 pr (1 r ) ( ) G 0 (0)
From the properties of G(:), it must be G 0 (0) > 0, so that a stable …xed point must satisfy condition > . Clearly, such a r satis…es condition drt+1 drt rt=r < 1. Thus, imposing that drt+1 drt rt=r > 1 we obtain the nonovershooting condition (13). Setting drt+1 drt rt=r = 1, we obtain the condition for the period-doubling bifurcation and the onset of periodic/chaotic behavior. See also Lamantia and Pezzino (2016) for details.
